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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An information filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court
charges defendant John Marks with murder and with two special
circumstances; (1) killing for financial gain and (2) killing the
victim while lying in wait.

(C.T. 2.)

At a pretrial hearing in 1981, the trial court expressly
doubted Marks's competency to stand trial, then ordered a hearing
to determine his competency.

(C.T. 2.)

When defendant next

appeared in court, his attorney told the court that Marks's case
was '"set for a 1368 [competency] trial, Your Honor, and I think

1

all 1368 matters have been resolved.*”
3d 1335, 1339 (1988)

People v. Marks. 45 Cal.

(hereinafter Marks I),

No competency hearing was held.

(C.T. 2.)

Defendant was

then convicted by a jury of murder of unspecified degree.
(C.T. 10-11.)

The jury found the financial gain special

circumstance to be true.

(C.T. 11.)

They found the

lying-in-wait special circumstance to be untrue, and also found
untrue the allegation that defendant personally used a gun.
(C.T. 11.)
In Marks I. this Court reversed defendant's murder
conviction because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing
pursuant to Penal Code sections 1368 and 1369 after specifically
stating a doubt as to Marks's competency to stand trial and
ordering a hearing to determine his competency.'

Id. at 1337-38.

Upon remand, a competency hearing was held and Marks was deemed
competent to stand trial.

(C.T. 2.)

At the resumed proceedings, Marks asked the trial court to
enter on his behalf pleas of former acquittal and once in
jeopardy to the first degree murder charge, to the special
circumstance charge, and to other charges.

(C.T. 20-22.)

Marks

contended that, by operation of section 1157,^ he was convicted
' Unless otherwise noted all statutory references hereafter
are to the California Penal Code.
^ "Whenever a defendant is convicted of a crime . . . which
is distinguished into degrees, the jury . . . must find the
degree of the crime ... of which he is guilty. Upon the
failure of the jury . . . to so determine, the degree of the
crime ... of which the defendant is guilty, shall be deemed to
be of the lesser degree."
2

of second degree murder because the jury at his first trial
failed to specify the degree of the murder he committed; he
argued that he was therefore acquitted of first degree murder.
(C.T. 14.)
law . .

The trial court agreed, stating that "by operation of

. this defendant was found guilty of . . . second degree

murder."

(C.T. 39.)

The court found that jeopardy had attached

and ruled that Harks could be tried only for second degree murder
and for a related conspiracy.

(C.T. 39.)

In February 1989, the People petitioned the Court of Appeal
for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to strike Marks's
pleas.

(C.T. 7.)

In December 1989, the writ issued directing

the trial court to set aside its ruling, to strike Marks's pleas
of former acquittal and once in jeopardy, and to set the matter
for trial.

People v. Superior Court (Marksl, 216 Cal. App. 3d

679, 688 (1989)

(hereinafter Marks II).

The appellate court

reasoned that the trial court's failure to hold a competency
hearing rendered the guilty verdict void, so that defendant was
neither placed in jeopardy nor acquitted of first degree murder.
Id.
Marks petitioned from this judgment and this Court granted
review on April 4, 1990.

People v. Superior Court (Marks)., 268

Cal. Rptr. 283 (1990).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court's failure to hold a mental

competency hearing pursuant to section 1368 render all final
3

dispositions of the trial void, thereby allowing the People to
validly prosecute the defendant for first degree murder?
2.

May the defendant be retried for first degree murder

after reversal of a conviction when that conviction, if let
stand, would have been deemed one of second degree murder by
operation of section 1157?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal will determine whether Petitioner may be
prosecuted for a hired killing.

Defendant claims to be immune

from prosecution for first degree murder because of errors made
at his first trial.

But these errors did not harm defendant: the

law protected him and his conviction was reversed.

Defendant now

asks this Court to wring further protection from the statutes
when none is warranted.
In essence, defendant argues that, while his previous
conviction was void, he was validly acquitted of first degree
murder.

His first contention rests on an incorrect and selective

interpretation of section 1368.

His second claim depends on an

inflated and imaginary construction of section 1157.
Section 1368 voids all criminal judgments, whether they
favor or damn the accused, by divesting the trial court of
subject matter jurisdiction.

An incompetent person cannot

validly stand trial in California.

Section 1368 expresses the

legislature's judgment that California courts are powerless to

4

adjudicate the innocence or guilt of persons who may not be
competent.
Section 1157 imposes a lesser conviction when the jury fails
to specify the degree of crime of which the defendant is guilty.
Its purpose is to avoid the costs of retrial when the sole error
in judgment lies in the form of the verdict.

When the statute

does apply, it offers a defendant no more than a conviction — it
throws no acquittals into the bargain.

When retrial is compelled

by other error, section 1157 does not apply.
Because Petitioner's prior prosecution was void before trial
began, he has never been placed in constitutional jeopardy.
Because he has not been acquitted, expressly or impliedly, the
double jeopardy prohibition is inapplicable.
The People merely seek a full and fair opportunity to test
defendant's responsibility for first degree murder.
has never had a fair trial.

Defendant

He cannot now seek to escape one.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO DETERMINE DEFENDANT'S MENTAL
COMPETENCY PURSUANT TO SECTION 1368 DIVESTED THE TRIAL COURT
OF JURISDICTION AND RENDERED ALL FINAL DISPOSITIONS VOID.
A.

Section 1368 voids all final dispositions in trials
wanting of a mental competency hearing bv divesting the
trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.

The trial court doubted defendant's competency to stand
trial but failed to hold a competency hearing.

Section 1368

thereafter divested the trial court of jurisdiction over further
criminal prosecution proceedings.
5

This jurisdictional defect

rendered all subsequent dispositions of the trial void.

Marks I.

45 Cal. 3d at 1337; People v. Hale. 45 Cal. 3d 531, 541 (1988).
Once conviction of the defendant became legally impossible, he
was outside the reach of constitutional jeopardy.
Somerville. 410 U.S. 458 (1973).

Illinois v.

His liberty could not be

impaired by a California court.
Section 1368 addresses a criminal defendant's mental
competency to stand trial.

If a trial court doubts the

defendant's competency to stand trial, then section 1368 requires
that court to order a hearing pursuant to section 1369 to
determine the matter.
direct this procedure.

The precepts of constitutional due process
Marks 1. 45 Cal. 3d at 1337.

The policy of prosecuting only those capable of aiding in
their defense is strongly enforced.

In fact, a court can raise

the issue sua sponte. as this Court did in Marks I.

Once the

issue is raised, it cannot be waived or conceded by the defendant
or by his counsel.

Marks 1. 45 Cal. 3d at 1340, 1342; Hale. 44

Cal. 3d at 541.
Finally, section 1368 divests a trial court of subject
matter jurisdiction to proceed in the criminal prosecution of the
defendant until his competency is determined pursuant to a
section 1369 hearing,

Marks I. 45 Cal. 3d at 1337; Hale. 44 Cal.

3d at 541.
The divestment of jurisdiction is not derived from judicial
decree but is statutorily mandated by section 1368 itself.
Section 1368 declares that "all proceedings in the criminal
6

prosecution shall be suspended** once a competency hearing is
required (emphasis added).

Further support that section 1368

divests the trial court of jurisdiction is found in the statute's
heading, which characterizes the divestment as a "stay of
criminal proceedings."

The statutory language denying

jurisdiction cannot be stronger.

In Marks I and in Hale. this

Court recognized the statutory mandate that jurisdiction be
divested.

Marks I. 45 Cal. 3d at 1337; Hale. 44 Cal. 3d at 541.

Failure to affirm this rule in the present case would contravene
those precedents.
In Hale, the trial court questioned defendant's competency
to stand trial, but did not hold a competency hearing.

The

criminal proceedings advanced and the jury convicted the
defendant of first degree murder.
conviction was a nullity.

This Court ruled that Hale's

Hale. 44 Cal. 3d at 541.

Section 1368

rendered the criminal proceedings "void because the court had
been divested of jurisdiction to proceed pending express
determination of the competency issue."

Id. (emphasis added).

Marks I further supports the rule that failure to hold a
required competency hearing deprives the trial court of
jurisdiction.

In Marks I. this Court sua soonte noted the

absence of the required competency hearing from the trial court
record.

This action demonstrates that section 1368 addresses

essential jurisdictional concerns.

Errors of law generally are

subject to remedy upon review; all, part, or none of the trial
judgment may be affected.

But when the trial court lacks
7

jurisdiction, there is no valid judgment that this Court may
review.
power.

In the former case, the trial court errs within its
In the latter, the trial court has no power to err.

Defendant tortures the reasoning of Marks I and

by

asking this Court to hold that his void conviction is a valid
acquittal.

Defendant's argument would require this Court to rule

that jurisdiction exists where the California legislature has
specifically withdrawn it — over "aH proceedings in the
nr-iminal prosecution" awaiting a competency hearing.
Code § 1368(c)

(West 1988)

Cal. Penal

(emphasis added).

Defendant's argument that his section 1157 acquittal is
valid, but that his conviction is void, relies on cases
inapposite to the issue.

He argues that there are two types of

jurisdictional defects, those that are "fundamental" and those in
which a court merely "exceeds" its jurisdiction.

To support this

proposition, defendant cites the dissenting opinion of yarks XI.
Defendant argues that a "fundamental" jurisdictional defect voids
the entire trial, but that when a court "acts in excess" of its
jurisdiction only the excessive acts are invalid.
distinction is without substance.’

This

There is but one result of a

jurisdictional defect: the extrajurisdictional actions of the

’ The People agree that there is a dichotomy in the types
of jurisdictional constraints, but not the dichotomy announced by
defendant. The correct distinction is between constitutional due
process constraints (see, e.g., Pennover y. Neffr 95 U.S.
(1877)) and arbitrary statutory jurisdictional limits (?«q«..f 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1989), the $50,000 amount-in-controversy required
to trigger federal diversity jurisdiction).
8

court are absolutely void.

Hale. 44 Cal. 3d at 541.

Defendant’s

own cases prove this principle.
People V. Broussard. 76 Cal. App. 3d 193 (1977), involved a
two-count criminal prosecution.

One charge rested on a valid

California statute, but no statute made criminal the conduct
described in the second charge.

The Broussard court held the

defendant's conviction of the nonexistent crime void, reasoning
that while the trial court had jurisdiction over the statutory
crime, it lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant for the
nonexistent crime.

Id. at 197.

Defendant argues that Broussard

is analogous to his position because the trial court had
jurisdiction over one criminal charge but not the other.
Defendant views this as supporting a rule of partial
jurisdiction, valid as to acquittal but invalid as to conviction.
Defendant fails to see that jurisdiction is absolute: it either
exists or does not.
Proper jurisdictional analysis requires that the proceedings
be severed into discrete jurisdictional acts.

For example, the

specific extrajurisdictional act in Broussard was the criminal
prosecution of the nonexistent crime.

Any proceedings in

furtherance of that charge were absolutely void.

See id_.

Applying this analysis to the instant case renders the same
result.

Here, the extrajurisdictional act occurred when the

trial court continued the criminal prosecution proceedings
without holding a competency hearing.

This act encompassed each

criminal count charged against Marks, rendering all the
9

subsequent criminal prosecution proceedings nugatory.

The

extrajurisdictional defect in Marks's case affected all charges.
In Broussard. the jurisdictional defect was confined to the one
nonexistent criminal charge,*

As in Broussard, the discrete

extrajurisdictional act rendered the subsequent prosecution
absolutely void.
People V, Stankevitz. 51 Cal. 3d 72 (1990), presents a case
where the trial court operated within its jurisdiction.

In

stankevitz. the trial court ordered a mental competency hearing
pursuant to section 1368.

Immediately following this order, the

defendant moved to substitute counsel.

The court granted the

defendant's motion and appointed a new defense attorney.

The

substitution order occurred after the court ordered the
competency hearing, but before it was held.

Thus, the trial

court had been statutorily divested of jurisdiction to proceed
with the criminal prosecution by virtue of section 1368(c).
Court held that the substitution order was not void.

This

Id. at 89.

Initially, Stankevitz appears to contradict the jurisdictional
analysis herein, but in fact it comports with it.
stankevitz did not involve an extrajurisdictional act
because "the trial court did not reinstate 'the case against the
defendant' in merely entertaining defendant's substitution

* Broussard did result in acquittal of the higher degree
crime. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 198. However, that result does not
control here. The Broussard jury impliedly acquitted Broussard
by choosing not to convict him of the statutory crime. In this
case we deal with a formally defective verdict. Section II of
this Argument explores this distinction.
10

motion.”

Id. at 88.

Consideration of the motion did not further

the criminal prosecution.

The People called no witnesses and

proffered no incriminating evidence.

Not only was the motion

collateral to the criminal proceedings, but it was necessary to
assure effective assistance of counsel.

As a matter collateral

to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence, appointment of
new counsel was not an extrajurisdictional act.

Id. at 89.

In

contrast, the proceedings held in the instant case went to the
heart of the criminal prosecution: the determination of those
charges defendant was to face.
Fong Foo v. United States. 369 U.S. 141 (1962), is also
inapplicable precedent to Marks's case.
jurisdictional matter.

It deals with no

In Fona Foo. the federal trial court had

"jurisdiction over [the defendants] and over the subject matter."
Id. at 143.

The trial court had power to acquit the defendants.

The Fong Foo trial court merely erred on a point of procedure;
its acquittals simply were "based on an egregiously erroneous
foundation."

Id.

The Fong Foo trial court was at no time

divested of jurisdiction.

Because the judgments of acquittal

were valid, the constitution dictated that jeopardy attach and
that retrial be prohibited.

Id.

In the present case, section

1368 divested the trial court of jurisdiction to prosecute the
defendant.

Thus Fong Foo does not control.

In summary, failure to hold a required section 1369 hearing
divested the court of jurisdiction to continue the criminal
prosecution.

This jurisdictional deprivation renders the
11

specific extra jurisdictional acts absolutely void.

The void acts

here consisted of all subsequent criminal proceedings.

Thus,

defendant has never been placed in jeopardy and therefore may be
prosecuted on all of the original counts.

Somerville. 410 U.S.

at 460-61, 468-71.

B.

Defendant's due process rights will not be violated by
retrial of first degree murder.

Defendant contends that reprosecution for first degree
murder violates constitutional due process.

He relies on the due

process principle announced in North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S.
711 (1969) .

Although a state cannot penalize a criminal

defendant for his election to exercise a right of appeal (id.
at 726) , this rule is inapplicable here, where defendant made no
election.

The People are not retaliating; they merely seek a

fair trial.
As discussed above, a section 1368 error affected the
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court.

The trial

court's lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by either party.
Marks I. 45 Cal. 3d at 1340; Hale. 44 Cal. 3d at 541.

Arguably,

the parties have an affirmative duty to advise the court of the
jurisdictional flaw when discovered.

Thus, defendant is not

being penalized for making an election because defendant had no
election to make.
The procedural history proves that Marks made no election.
This Court raised the jurisdictional issue sua sponte.

12

Defendant

did not elect to raise the competency issue on appeal.

His due

process rights are intact.

C.

Policy compels the rule that failure to hold a recmired
competency hearing voids all criminal prosecution
proceedings regardless of outcome.

This Court can avoid recurrences of the section 1368 problem
presented in this case.

To do so, this Court must rule that all

criminal prosecution proceedings held in violation of section
1368 are void.

A contrary rule would grant criminal defendants a

tactic that will have a costly effect on California's scarce
judicial resources and will subvert justice.
Future criminal defendants who wish to avail themselves of
the rule suggested by Petitioner — that convictions entered in
violation of section 1368 are void, but that acquittals are valid
— need only proceed as follows.

First, defendant must raise the

question of his competency to stand trial.

If the court then

doubts defendant's competency, the proceedings are immediately
suspended pending the competency hearing.

If trial is then held

without the required competency hearing and determination,
defendant has nothing to lose: he is immune from conviction
because no competency hearing was held, yet has a ghenge “to be
acquitted.

Defendant is not placed in jeopardy.

The rule

Petitioner advocates gives future criminal defendants an
incentive to prompt a mandatory competency hearing and, at the
same time, supplies a disincentive to demand that this required

13

hearing be held.

Thus, a law enacted to protect the accused

becomes his weapon to defeat criminal responsibility.
Such a rule may lead to fraud and deceit upon trial courts.
Our case exemplifies this logic.

Here, defendant's own counsel

informed the trial court that the section 1368 mental competency
"matters [had] been resolved."

Marks I. 45 Cal. 3d at 1339.

The

trial court, accepting the representation of defendant's own
attorney, believed itself empowered to proceed to trial.

As the

cases establish, this error occurs frequently and should not be
taken lightly.

See,

Marks I, 45 Cal. 3d at 1337-41; Hale,

44 Cal. 3d at 540-41; People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508
(1967).
Criminal defendants should not be given the incentive to
defraud California's overworked trial courts by building the
foundation for inadvertent section 1368 error.

More important, a

criminal defendant should not benefit when his own counsel
misleads the court.
The better rule avoids the carrot of the conviction-free
trial and also eschews the stick of penalizing the criminal
defendant.

This rule merely holds that a section 1368 error

divests a trial court of jurisdiction over all the criminal
prosecution proceedings, rendering all final dispositions void
regardless of their outcome.
entails no prejudice.

The result works no fraud and

Rather, it leads at last to a fair trial.

14

II.

DEFENDANT MAY BE TRIED FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER
NOTWITHSTANDING PENAL CODE SECTION 1157,
A.

There is no conviction to which section 1157 may be
applied.

Defendant questions whether he can be retried for first
degree murder when Penal Code section 1157, had it been applied
to his former conviction, might have converted that conviction to
second degree murder.*
* This question may be answered simply:
because of this Court's reversal of defendant's earlier
conviction in Marks I. there is now no conviction to which
section 1157 may be applied.^
Defendant's arguments under section 1157 cannot help him if
the court that wrote his conviction was without power to do so.
The People nevertheless respond to Petitioner's arguments in
order to confine section 1157 to its language, its history, and
its policy.

B.

A conviction under Penal Code section 1157 of the
lesser degree of a crime is not an accmittal of the
greater degree of the crime.

The language of section 1157 does not reach as far as
Petitioner would extend it.

Section 1157 concerns convictions

* Section I of this Argument shows that the court that first
tried Marks for murder was divested of jurisdiction when it
failed to hold a competency hearing. This affliction stripped
all subsequent proceedings in that court of If9^1 force.
Defendant now seeks to salvage this void conviction and, as the
discussion below shows, further seeks to transform that void
conviction into a valid acquittal.
* There is a second easy answer: no authority supports the
novel contention that section 1157 applies to convictions that
are void when made.
15

only? by its terms, it acquits no one.

In its first sentence,

section 1157 requires that a jury specify the degree of a
defendant's crime when that crime is divided into degrees.^

The

second sentence remedies a judgment that fails to so specify.
There is no more language.

The statute merely imposes a lesser

conviction in order to remedy an unspecific finding, and
otherwise is silent.
Nor have courts stretched section 1157 to fit defendant's
contentions.

This Court has strictly construed section 1157,

fixing convictions at the lesser degree even when the resulting
conviction contravenes the jury's plain intention to convict of a
greater crime.

At the same time, this Court has confined the

provision to the boundaries of its language.
In People v- McDonald. 37 Cal. 3d 351 (1984), a jury
convicted defendant of murder? they did not specify degree, but
found true a robbery special circumstance.’

After the trial

court resubmitted the degree question to the jury at the penalty
phase, the jury found first degree murder.

This Court held that

^ "Whenever a defendant is convicted of a crime . . . which
is distinguished into degrees, the jury . . . must find the
of which he is guilty."
degree of the crime
® "Upon the failure of the jury . . , to so determine, the
degree of the crime ... of which the defendant is guilty, shall
be deemed to be of the lesser degree."
’ Oddly, the jury found McDonald not guilty of robbery. The
people had proceeded on a theory of felony murder,
guilty verdict precluded recharging of the robbery. Without an
underlying felony, retrial of first degree murder was thus
impossible. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d at 383 n.31.
16

section 1157 nevertheless fixed defendant's conviction at the
second degree:
the key is not whether the 'true intent* of the ju^
can be gleaned from circumstances outside the verdict
form itself; instead, application of the statute turns
only on whether the jury specified the degree in the
verdict form.
Id. at 382.

Section 1157 "'establishes a rule to which there is

to be no exception, and the Courts have no authority to create an
exception when the statute makes none.'"

(quoting people v-

Campbell. 40 Cal. 129, 138 (1870)).
Marks's first jury convicted him of murder and found a
special circumstance to be true.

All parties understood Marks to

be guilty of first degree murder — indeed, the record does not
show that defendant objected to suffering a penalty phase,
although he might have avoided that procedure by invoking section
1157,

If Marks's conviction had not been struck in Mar)£s_I,

section 1157 and McDonald would likely command that he be
convicted of second degree murder.

But they would require no

more.
Courts have long recognized that section 1157 often works
considerable inequity by awarding a defendant a less onerous
conviction for his more egregious crime.

They have long

hesitated to apply section 1157 where to do so relieves a
defendant of responsibility for his crimes.
People

V.

For example, in

Lamb. 176 Cal. App. 3d 932 (1986), the Court of Appeal

17

refused to apply section 1192,'° despite the trial court's
failure to determine the degree of burglary, because defendant
had expressly pleaded guilty to burglary in the first degree.
The Lamb court complained that sections 1157 and 1192
have been strictly and literally applied in favor
of defendants to occasionally reach results which have
been described as a triumph of form over substance.
The frustration with form arises because the appellate
court may not imply the degree of the crime from some
other factual findings even though the logical
reasoning process would leave no room for doubt on the
degree of crime to which the defendant was found to be
guilty ....
Id. at 934 (citations omitted).

Similar frustration was

expressed by this Court 120 years ago.

Campbell, 40 Cal. at

139-40.
This criticism persists.

Last year, in People v. Bonillas.

48 Cal. 3d 757 (1989), this Court again reviewed section 1157.
In Bonillas, the jury returned a verdict of "guilty of murder as
charged in the information."

Id. at 768.

Four days later, the

trial court denied defendant's motion to fix the conviction at
second degree; it then ordered the jury to consider the degree
question.
degree.

The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first
This Court refused to apply section 1157, stating that

because "the jury here [had] remained in the court's
control . . . the court was authorized to reconvene the jury to
complete its verdict."

Id. at 773.

Section 1192 mirrors section 1157 but applies to guilty
pleas and bench trials.
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Justice Arguelles concurred, disparaging otherwise "rigid
application of section 1157":
From virtually the outset of the provision's enactment,
many cases have construed section 1157 as pres^ibing
an inflexible rule, which often requires a court to
reduce the degree of a crime in the face of clear and
reliable evidence that the jury must have actually
found the defendant guilty of the higher degree
offense.
Id. at 802-03.
Bnnnias avoided application of section 1157 by upholding
the express degree finding of a reconvened jury.

Lajnb held that

section 1192 did not apply despite the unspecific finding of the
trial court, where defendant's own plea specified the degree of
the offense.

In People v. Johns. 145 Cal. App. 3d 281 (1983),

section 1157 could not be avoided, but the appellate court
nevertheless lamented, "[u]nfortunately, on this point, form
triumphs over substance, and the law is traduced."

at 295.

in p.nme V. Dixon. 24 Cal. 3d 43 (1979), defendant sought
to apply section 1157 where the record suggested that the jury
had been deadloc)ced on the question of degree.

When the judge

instructed them to further deliberate, they returned a verdict of
first degree murder.

This Court refused to extend section 1157

beyond its explicit language, holding it inapplicable where the
jury is unable to specify degree.

Idj. at 52.

In the instant case, Petitioner asks for much more.

Having

secured one reversal, Marks first invokes section 1157 where it
does not apply.

He then extends it beyond its plain language by

asking this Court to deem him acquitted of the charge for which
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the jury thought him responsible.

It is true that Marks night

have been deemed guilty of second degree murder had a proper
competency hearing been held.

But nothing in the language of

section 1157 suggests that he be deemed acquitted of murder in
the first degree.

The message of McDonald. Cairtpt>?llf

and

Bonillas is to the contrary: section 1157 is to be enforced where
it applies, when it applies.

Nothing in California law compels

the expansion that defendant seeks.
Dictum may be found to say that, where defendant is
convicted of second degree murder under section 1157, "by that
verdict he had been acquitted of first degree murder."
Hughes. 171 Cal. App. 2d 362, 370 (1959).

people v,

Hvqllgg posed no

question of acquittal and no question of retrial.
raised nor answered a former jeopardy question.

It neither
Hughes simply

rejected the trial court's resubmission to the jury of a degree
question after the penalty phase had begun.
Defendant's arguments conflict not only with the plain
language of section 1157 and with the confines of its subsequent
judicial construction, but with the statute's underlying policy.
The rationale that supports section 1157 is not implicated where
retrial is compelled by other error.
Until 1949, section 1157 provided no remedy for the jury's
failure to specify degree.

The court-crafted remedy was to set

aside the verdict and order a new trial.

People v.—l^e Yune

" This Court has found other error in the Hughes decision.
See Bonillas, 48 Cal. 3d at 774.
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Chong. 94 Cal. 379, 386 (1892).

The legislature overruled this

practice in 1949 by amending both sections 1157 and 1192.

Sfig In

Harris. 67 Cal. 2d 876 (1967).
This Court has recognized that the legislature's purpose in
enacting the 1949 amendments was not to reward defendants for
errors of court and jury, but to avoid the onus of duplicate
trials when that burden is founded on a mere formal defect in the
verdict.

Id. at 881.

"By amending section 1192 the legislature

. . . determined that the state's interest in securing a
conviction of a higher degree is outweighed by the administrative
convenience of terminating litigation by imposing a lesser
sentence when the trial court fails to determine the
degree."

Id.

Retrial doubles the cost of prosecution and taxes state
coffers.

In enacting sections 1157 and 1192, the legislature

sacrificed the state's right to retry an accused for the sole
purpose of administrative convenience.

The legislature

recognized that a mere defect in verdict form did not justify the
costs of a new trial.

These enactments are a simple gujd pro

quo: in exchange for a valid conviction, the state forfeits its
right to retry the defendant.’^

The state's sole incentive lies

in the administrative savings.

Clearly, if the legislature wished to reward defendants
with acquittals, they could have expressly done so either when
they amended sections 1157 and 1192 in 1949, or in any of the 41
years that have followed.
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Where retrial is compelled by other error, there is no
convenience and no incentive.

The state saves nothing.

Because

of the disposition of Marks's automatic appeal, the state's
choice is either to retry him or to drop all charges.

But the

legislature struck its bargain under section 1157 with only those
defendants who do not face retrial

whose convictions are

afflicted only by unspecific degree findings.

It did not and

would not choose to forfeit its right to retry a defendant whose
conviction is reversed on grounds other than those covered by
sections 1157 and 1192.
This mi id pro quo is a narrow bargain: in exchange for the
state's sacrifice, defendant receives a lesser conviction.
Marks asks for much more.

But

First, he asks that the lesser

conviction he might have received be deemed an acquittal of the
greater crime with which he was charged.

Then he asks that this

possible lesser conviction be deemed jeopardy, barring retrial of
the greater offense.

Petitioner neglects to see that in enacting

sections 1157 and 1192, the legislature's purpose was to obtain
convictions, not to avoid them.

C.

Defendant has not been placed jn constitutional
-ieopardv.

Section 1023 codifies the double jeopardy provision of
article 1, section 15 of the California Constitution by barring a
second prosecution whenever defendant "is convicted or acquitted
or has been once placed in jeopardy . . . ."

A defendant may

nevertheless be tried twice when his prior conviction has been
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set aside on appeal.

Green v. United States. 355 U.S. 184, 189

(1957) .
Over 100 years ago, this Court rejected the argument that
double jeopardy bars retrial of an offense when an earlier
verdict is faulty because of an unspecific degree finding.
People V. Travers. 75 Cal. 580, 582-83 (1887).

Marks argues that

his case falls within the doctrine of implied acquittal
subsequently announced by the United States Supreme Court in
Green and adopted by this Court in Gomez v,_ Superior Court, 50
Cal. 2d 640 (1958).
Defendant's case does not fall within the doctrine of
implied acquittal.

In Gomez, this Court held that a defendant's

prior conviction of petty theft impliedly acquitted him of grand
theft and thus precluded the People from retrying defendant for
the greater offense.

Gomez is fundamentally different from

Marks's case: Gomez's jury chose to convict him of the lesser
crime, thus implying that he was not proved guilty of the greater
offense.

Gomez did not arise under and does not implicate

section 1157.

Gomez has been applied only where the jury tests

the facts against the evidence and makes an explicit finding that
only the lesser crime has been proved.

A section 1157

conviction, on the other hand, is imposed regardless of the
evidence and without consideration of the facts, for the sole
purpose to avoid costly retrial.
Here, the record shows that Marks's prior jury wished to
convict him of the greater offense but were not properly
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instructed to find degree.

Gomez, where the jury was instructed

about two offenses but found only one to be true, thus implicated
the established rule that, once acquitted, a defendant cannot be
retried for the same offense.
U.S. 662, 671 (1896).

See United States v,_163

Marks stands in different shoes: he was

not expressly convicted of a lesser crime but was rather
convicted of "murder" generally.

And the record is clear that

his prior jury, who later fixed his penalty at death, wished to
convict him of murder in the first degree.'^

Marks was impliedly

acquitted of nothing.
Gomez was jeopardized by his trial, but Petitioner was not.
Marks*s first jury was powerless to acquit or convict him.

As

Section I of this Argument shows, the trial court lost
jurisdiction upon its failure to hold a competency hearing.
Although this defect was unrecognized at the time, the
proceedings that followed nonetheless lacked a breath of legal
force.

Power had been stripped from the court, which was

thereafter unable lawfully to empanel a jury.

The jury was

therefore powerless under the law to determine Marks's innocence
or guilt.

Because no competency hearing was held, the subseqi^ent

prosecution was void.

It was void then and it is void now.

Under McDonald, this circumstance could not defeat
section 1157, if it applied to Petitioner's case. Mcponald turns
a blind eye to the intention of the jury. But under gomez, the
intention of the jury determines whether a defendant has been
impliedly acquitted for former jeopardy purposes. Thus, only a
sighted eye can determine whether Marks was impliedly acquitted
of first degree murder when his prior jury (a) convicted him of
murder, (b) found the special circumstance true, and <c) set the
penalty at death.
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Marks's suggestion that he was jeapordized by these null
pjfoceedings is nonsensical.
Further, Gomez applies only where acquittal may be implied
from the jury's choice of a lesser conviction.

No acquittal is

implied by a conviction under section 1157, which concerns
convictions only, and which exists solely for the purpose of
administrative convenience.

"[Slection 1157's mandate ... is

not based on constitutional principles of double jeopardy but is
based on a pure legislative enactment which inures to the benefit
of the defendant."
(1990).

People v. Saille. 221 Cal. App. 3d 307, 328

In Gomez, defendant's conviction was fixed by a jury who

had tested the evidence against the facts.

In contrast, a

conviction under section 1157 is made by fiat.

It is a judgment

read from a statute book, imposed regardless of actual guilt.
"The determination of degree pursuant to section 1157 is not a
factual acquittal by the jury; it is not based on a lack of
substantial evidence; and it does not involve precepts of double
jeopardy.”

D,

Sallle. 221 Cal. App. 3d at 329.

The state has had no full and fair opportunity ^o try
the defendant.

The double jeopardy prohibition serves several purposes,
none of which are implicated in Petitioner's case.

The rule

prevents the state from repeatedly attempting to convict a
defendant for the same offense, subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense, ordeal, and harassment,

gpggn, 355 U.S. at 187-88.

also '"forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the
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It

prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it
failed to muster in the first proceeding.***

People v.

pr.r;Versmith. 217 Cal. App. 3d 968, 972 (1990).

The state is

nevertheless entitled to a full and fair opportunity to convict
the defendant.

Richardson v. United States. 468 U.S. 317, 326

(1984).
In the instant case, the state has had no full and fair
opportunity to try Petitioner.

The People played no role in the

error that led to reversal of defendant*s conviction.
Defendant*s counsel informed the trial court that the
section 1368 question had been resolved and that he and two
psychiatrists believed that Marks was competent to stand trial.
The People lacked the knowledge and the need to contest this
representation.

This Court nevertheless reversed the conviction

that followed because the trial court did not hold a competency
hearing.

Not only was defendant*s conviction void, but the

foundation of that voidness was laid by his own counsel.
Nor does the record show that the People prevented a second
degree murder instruction from being read at trial: **the trial
court inexplicably denied defendant's requested instruction . . .
that the jury specify the degree of murder."

Marks I, 45 Cal. 3d

at 1344.
Nor can the state be said to be repeatedly trying to convict
defendant of the same offense.

In truth, the state has once

convicted him of first degree murder.

The record shows it: a

conviction of murder with a special circumstance finding and a
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sentence of death.

Marks does not allege that the People seek

retrial to harass or embarass him or to muster new evidence.
Indeed, the People seek only to fairly try defendant's
responsibility for murder.

The state has not tried once and

failed to make this proof: it has tried and succeeded.
When a defendant has been erroneously convicted, as Marks
has been, double jeopardy does not bar a second trial of the
offense.

United States v, Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964).

CONCLUSION
The appellate court correctly ruled that Penal Code section
1368 strips a trial court of jurisdiction to convict or to
exonerate an accused when competency is doubted but is not
properly determined.

This ruling should be affirmed.

Penal Code section 1157 should not be extended to award
acquittals, whether actual or implied.

It must be limited to its

language and its policy.
Finally, the implied acquittal principle of green and Gojtiez
should not be extended to this case, where the prior jury
explicitly believed defendant to be guilty of first degree murder
and impliedly acquitted him of nothing.

Petitioner was not

jeopardized by these proceedings, which were void when begun.
For the above reasons, defendant may be tried again for
first degree murder.
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Dated

23 October 1990

